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Increased and Accessible Illinois Judicial
Rulemaking
JEFFREY

A.

PARNESS*

BRUCE ELLIOTT KELLER**

INTRODUCTION

Much of the responsibility in Illinois for establishing procedural
law guiding the operation of courts and the practice of law is now
shared by the General Assembly and the Illinois Supreme Court.
While pockets of guidelines are, and should be, within the judiciary's
absolute control and thus immunized from any legislative interference,
less than absolute judicial authority over the bulk of procedural law
is preferred by most commentators and by most American states.' In
settings where such responsibility is shared, typically there is a primary
lawmaker, who initiates most procedural law changes, and a secondary
lawmaker, who possesses far less initial responsibility but who usually
maintains some final power of review. Where procedural lawmaking
responsibility is shared, there are varying means by which the primary
and secondary authority may be distributed and exercised.
Unfortunately, the present distribution of responsibility for Illinois procedural law is troublesome. The division of primary authority
between the legislature and the judiciary is unclear, resulting in
instances of conflicting statutes and rules. Where primary authority
has been assumed by the legislature, the choice of primary lawmaker
is wrong. As well, the attributes of secondary authority over procedural law are uncertain, as evidenced by cases involving exclusive
judicial rulemaking.
*
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1. See KORBAKES, ALFINI & GRAU, JUDICIAL RULEMAKING IN THE STATE COURTS
(1984) (50 state survey of judicial rulemaking procedures). For an excellent bibliog-

raphy on judicial rulemaking, see id. at 293-306. See also GRAU,
ING: ADMINISTRATION, ACCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1984).
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Besides distributional problems, the exercise of procedural lawmaking power often is troublesome because of the decision-making
processes utilized. In particular, in promulgating rules, the Illinois
Supreme Court usually employs too secretive and closed a process.
This process typically involves advisory committees whose members,
duties and ongoing work are relatively unknown. 2 And, in enacting
procedural statutes, the General Assembly also often employs an
inadequate deliberative process, in that it fails to hear fully from the
legal profession. Exemplary is its recent consideration of standards
on the certification of claims by attorneys.'
This Article suggests that all primary authority over procedural
law should now be vested in the Illinois judiciary, with the General
Assembly possessing only secondary authority. Part I explains that
increased judicial responsibility is supported by the Illinois Constitution, particularly when read in light of its history, and by rationales
founded on expertise, efficiency and separation of powers. Greater
judicial control over procedure should not be fully assumed by the
supreme court; rather, bodies consisting of judges from varying
courts, as well as lawyers, legislators and others, should exercise
significant rulemaking duties. Finally, all judicial rulemaking processes
must be open and accessible.
Constitutional amendment is the best, and perhaps the only, way
to remedy existing problems in the distribution and exercise of procedural lawmaking responsibility. The current hodgepodge of constitutional provisions should be replaced by a small set of directives
which clearly define primary and secondary authority. The recognition
of primary judicial authority should be accompanied by assurances
that judicial rulemakers employ open and accessible decision-making
processes. While Illinois judges are quite accustomed to law-making
during adjudication, they are less experienced in lawmaking during
rule promulgation. Experience indicates that Illinois judicial rulemaking now occurs on occasion without significant opportunity for public
input. Promulgation of rules in closed and secretive meetings should
hereinafter be expressly discouraged in order to assure greater adherence to democratic principles and better rules.
I.

INCREASED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY FOR PROCEDURAL LAW

Current Illinois constitutional law recognizes a shared responsibility for most procedural law. Beyond the general provisions dealing
2. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.

3. See infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text.
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with separation of powers 4 and the vesting of legislative' and judicial
powers, the constitution contains several provisions expressly recognizing both legislative and judicial responsibility for laws guiding the
courts and the legal profession. Legislative responsibility is recognized
in constitutional declarations that the "Appellate Court shall have
such powers of direct review of administrative action as provided by
law" 7 and that "Circuit Courts shall have such power to review
administrative action as provided by law." 8 Judicial responsibility is
recognized in statements that the supreme court "shall" provide by
rule for certain matters relating to appeals; 9 "may" provide by rule
for other appellate matters;' 0 "shall adopt rules of conduct for Judges
and Associate Judges;"" and "shall provide by rule for matters to be
assigned to Associate Judges.' 2 Further, the constitution provides
that the general administrative and supervisory authority over all
courts is vested in the Illinois Supreme Court, to be exercised by its
Chief Justice in accordance with its rules. 3
Notwithstanding such declarations, much of the responsibility for
Illinois procedural law remains unaddressed constitutionally. There
are no express provisions on practice and procedure laws, on evidentiary principles, or on regulations governing the practice of law.
However, there have been attempts at change. In 1922, for example,
there was a proposal to add to the Illinois Constitution the following:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive power to prescribe
rules of pleading, practice and procedure in all courts; but
rules not inconsistent therewith may be prescribed respectively
by other courts of record. Any rule of pleading, practice or
procedure may be set aside by the4 General Assembly by a
special law limited to that purpose.1

4. ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
6. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
7. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (emphasis added).
8. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 9 (emphasis added).
9. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4(b), 5, and 6.
10. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
11. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13(a).
12. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
13. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16. Of course, an express recognition of judicial
rulemaking power may be superfluous should such a power exist in the absence of
any constitutional delegation. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985)
(appellate courts have "supervisory powers that permit, at the least, the promulgation
of procedural rules governing the management of litigation", though there is no
mention of a provision expressly delegating such authority).
14.

V 4778.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, FIFTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

Vol.
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And in 1952, the following constitutional amendment was urged:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing practice and
procedure in all courts. Subject to its rules, the judges of each
district of the appellate court and the circuit judges of each
circuit court may make rules governing practice and procedure
in their courts. 5
Though efforts to add such new provisions have been unsuccessful
to date, other Illinois constitutional history suggests that much primary authority for procedural law shifted to the judiciary. Public
policy rationales as well as constitutional history support the desirability of increased judicial rulemaking and several Illinois Supreme
Court decisions have recognized the shift toward greater judicial
accountability. 6 Yet, to date, the high court has failed to exercise this
new authority in a significant manner. Further, the legislature has
given few signals of its willingness, or wish, to reduce its role in
procedural law-making. Constitutional amendments seem necessary
so that the boundaries between legislative and judicial responsibility
for procedural law are clearer and so that increased judicial rulemaking will be assured.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

Over the years, the General Assembly has been delegated less and
less control over court structure and jurisdiction and thus over judicial
power. Increasingly, the parameters of the judicial power are being
defined constitutionally, with the result that the General Assembly's
authority regarding court procedure is more frequently founded on
the general grant of legislative power and less frequently on specific
delegations of authority over courts.
15. Proposed amendment to the Judicial Article of the ILL. CONST. of 1870,
art. VI, § 3 (1952). The high court power was seen as not disturbing "the historic
power of the legislature to act where the court has not acted." MEMBERS OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE, EXPLANATORY STATEMENT ON THE
PROPOSED JUDICIAL ARTICLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 41 (W.

Cedarquist ed. 1953). See also Trumbull, Judicial Responsibility for Regulating
Practiceand Procedure in Illinois, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 443, 455 (1952).

16. See, e.g., People v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937) (see infra
notes 43-51 and accompanying text); People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 119 IlI. 2d 485,
519 N.E.2d 898 (1988) (see infra notes 52-62 and accompanying text); People v.
Taylor, 50 I11. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1971) (see infra notes 63-71 and accompanying
text); People v. Jackson, 69 I11.2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977) (see infra notes 7281 and accompanying text).
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As well, the inherent (that is, the unarticulated, or implicit)
judicial authority over procedural law can now more frequently be
grounded on constitutional principles. Thus, statutory bases for judicial rulemaking are becoming less relevant (or irrelevant). When
judicial authority over procedural law inheres in the constitution,
because the judiciary must possess the tools to accomplish its constitutionally-assigned tasks, resulting rules are more likely immunized
from legislative change. This is especially true when the judicial
authority inheres in a constitutional provision expressly recognizing
judicial rulemaking power and failing to indicate any role for the
legislature.
A brief review of Illinois constitutional history demonstrates
increasing judicial, and diminishing General Assembly, responsibility
for courts, for their procedure, and for the legal profession.
Under the 1818 Constitution, the powers of government were
divided between the legislative, executive and judicial departments;"
no department could exercise any powers of another unless "expressly
directed or permitted."'" The legislative department was, however,
granted significant duties regarding the judicial department. For example, one provision said: "The judicial power of this state shall be
vested in one supreme court, and such inferior courts as the general
assembly shall . . . ordain and establish."' 9 Other provisions authorized the legislature to require high court justices to "hold circuit
courts," 2 0 and mandated2 it to provide for the appointment and duties
of justices of the peace. '
Under the 1848 Constitution, legislative duties regarding Illinois
courts and their procedures were continued, but reduced. The General
22
Assembly could authorize "courts of justice" to grant divorces and
could direct "in what manner suits may be brought against the
state."21 3 It could no longer require high court-justices to "hold circuit
courts." Most importantly, the Assembly's total control over lower
courts was eliminated. The new constitution declared:
The judicial power of this state shall be and is hereby vested
in one supreme court, in circuit courts, in county courts, and
17. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 1.
18. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 2.
19. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 1.
20. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 4.
21. iLL. CONST. of 1818, art. IV, § 8.
22. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. IIl, § 32.
23. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. 11, § 34.
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in justices of the peace; Provided, that inferior local courts
.. . may be established by the general assembly in the cities
.*. but such courts shall have a uniform organization and

jurisdiction ....

24

No longer were all lower courts ordained and established by the
legislature. Further, the jurisdiction of the circuit courts was defined
constitutionally.2 Yet, the duties of such lower court officials as
county judges and justices of the peace continued to be prescribed
chiefly by the legislature.26
Under the 1870 Constitution, there was a further erosion of
legislative authority over procedural law. The General Assembly could
not pass local or special laws for regulating the practice in courts of
justice; for regulating the jurisdiction and duties of justices of the
peace, police magistrates and constables; for changes of venue; for
summoning and impaneling juries; or for any other area where a
general law could be made applicable.27 Furthermore, legislative control over the judicial power in the lower courts was diminished, as
exemplified by new provisions prescribing much of the jurisdictional
authority of county courts and probate courts. 2 Nevertheless, the
24. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 1.
25. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, § 8:
There shall be two or more terms of the circuit court held annually in each
county of this state, at such times as shall be provided by law; and said
courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity, and in all cases
of appeals from all inferior courts.
26. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. V, §§ 18, 19:
§ 18. The jurisdiction of said court shall extend to all probate and such
other jurisdiction as the general assembly may confer in civil cases, and
such criminal cases as may be prescribed by law, where the punishment is
by fine only, not exceeding $100.
§ 19. The county judge, with such justices of the peace in each county as
may be designated by law, shall hold terms for the transaction of county
business, and shall perform such other duties as the general assembly shall
prescribe: Provided, the general assembly may require that two justices, to
be chosen by the qualified electors of each county, shall sit with the county
judge in all cases; and there shall be elected, quadrenially, in each county,
a clerk of the county court, who shall be ex officio recorder, whose
compensation shall be fees: Provided, the general assembly may, by law,
make the clerk of the circuit court ex officio recorder, in lieu of the county
clerk.
27. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22.
All judges and state's attorneys shall be commissioned by the governor.
28. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, §§ 18, 20. See also ILL. CONST. of 1870, art.
VI, § 23 (continuation of superior court of Chicago) and ILL. CONST. of 1870, art.
VI, § 26 (criminal court of Cook county).
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1870 Constitution continued to permit significant legislative control
over judicial power. It expressly recognized legislative authority to
' 29 and to establish a "probate court
create "inferior appellate courts
in each county having a population over 50,000."0
General Assembly responsibility for court structure, and thus for
procedural law, was dramatically reduced with the constitutional
amendments of 1962. One amendment was worded as follows: "The
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, an Appellate Court and
Circuit Courts." 3 1 No longer were lower courts to be ordained and
established legislatively. Other amendments wholly or substantially
eliminated legislative authority over the jurisdiction of the lower
courts.3 2 In addition, an amendment declared that the Supreme Court
was vested with "general administrative authority over all courts,"
33
with no express recognition of the opportunity for legislative review.
The movement toward increased judicial rulemaking authority
continued under the 1970 Constitution. Thus, while a 1962 amendment
granted the Supreme Court the authority to provide by rule for direct
circuit courts to the high court
appeal in certain cases from the' 34
"subject to law hereafter enacted,
the new constitution stated that
the supreme court shall provide by rule for direct appeal in such
35
cases, without mentioning the impact of any legislative enactments.
Similarly, a 1962 amendment provided that circuit judges shall appoint
' 3 6 while the
magistrates to serve at their pleasure "subject to law,
new 1970 Constitution provided that circuit courts "shall have such
7
number of Associate Judges as provided by law," with the matters
3
assigned to associate judges guided by Illinois Supreme Court rule. "
In addition, the 1970 Constitution declared that the "Supreme Court
29. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11.
30. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 20. See also ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI,
§ 12 (legislature dictates appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts).
31. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 1 (1962).
32. Compare ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12 with ILL. CONST. of 1870, art.
VI, § 9 (1962) (circuit court); compare ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 11 with ILL.
CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 7 (1962) (appellate court). Incidentally, the continuing
statutory authorization of a Court of Claims, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 439.1
(1985), seemingly can be justified by the continuing General Assembly responsibility
for sovereign immunity law. See ILL. CO NST. art. XIII, § 4.
33. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 2.
34. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 5 (1962).
35. ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4(b).
36. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 12 (1962).
37. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
38. ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 8.
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shall adopt rules of conduct for Judges and Associate Judges," 39
making no mention of legislative review.
The trend is clear. Illinois constitutional history from 1818 to
1970 reflects diminishing legislative influence on the Illinois court
system. Over the years, the General Assembly's power to create courts
and procedural law for the legal profession has diminished. This
history also reflects increasing constitutional mandates regarding the
structure of state courts and their powers. Such mandates, where
ambiguous, are ultimately clarified by judges. Thus, judges are increasingly compelled to define the contours of their constitutional
duties and the necessary means by which such duties must be undertaken. In this setting there is more frequently recognized an increased
judicial responsibility for procedural law. 40
B.

RATIONALES SUPPORTING INCREASED JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Beyond this constitutional history, increased judicial authority
over procedural law can be founded on compelling public policy
grounds. in their seminal work on constitutional allocations of procedural lawmaking powers between the legislature and the judiciary,
Professors Levin and Amsterdam summarized the arguments supporting primary judicial authority as follows:
[L]egislatures have neither the immediate familiarity with the
day-by-day practice of the courts which would allow them to
isolate the pressing problems of procedural revision nor the
experience and expertness necessary to the solution of these
problems; legislatures are intolerably slow to act and cause
even the slightest and most obviously necessary matter of
procedural change to be long delayed; legislatures are subject
to the influence of other pressures than those which seek the
efficient administration of justice and may often push through
some particular and ill-advised pet project of an influential
legislator while the comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a
39. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 13(a).
40. Bonaguro, The Supreme Court's Exclusive Rulemaking Authority, 67 ILL.
B.J. 408 (1979). This is not to suggest that where a legislature has absolute control
over a court's business, even to the point of being able to abolish the court, there is
also absolute legislative control over the ways in which such business is conducted.

See U.S. v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd, 590
F.2d 564

(4th Cir. 1979) ("the fact that Congress can create the lower federal courts does not
alter the conclusion that it cannot validly establish a timetable for judicial action").
Inherent in legislative establishment of a court may be a delegation of certain
judicial

powers immunized from legislative review absent disestablishment.
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bar association molders in committee; and legislatures are not
held responsible in the public eye for the efficient administration of the courts and hence do not feel pressed to constant
reexamination of procedural methods.
Moreover, it must be remembered that a very large part
of maintaining maximum effectiveness in the courts does not
lie in drastic wholesale procedural reform, but in the necessary
minor alterations of single rules from time to time as experience dictates, and such small matters as these inevitably fare
badly when they must compete for legislative attention ...
Codes tend to foster litigation of procedural issues, since the
legislature cannot clarify by simple pronouncement whatever
ambiguity may inhere in its codes and the courts themselves
can provide clarification only in the process of adjudication.
Court rules, on the other hand, are flexible in application,
easy of clarification, and rapid of amendment should amendment be required. They are the work of an agency whose
whole business is court business and for whom court efficiency
can become a major interest, an agency keenly aware of the
to bear in their
latest problems and fully capable of bringing
41
experience.
solid
and
early solution a long
In Illinois, these bases supporting primary judicial authority are
joined with rationales related to the troubles caused by existing
divisions of procedural lawmaking responsibility. The constitution
now indicates that much of the responsibility for procedure is shared
by the General Assembly and the supreme court. Some uncertainty
among lawmakers about accountability is inevitable in such a system.
As well, some difficulty in harmonizing statutes and rules covering a
single topic is normal. Yet, confusion is heightened in Illinois, since
different bodies are designated as the primary lawmaker, with the
differences based on the nature of the procedural guidelines. Legal
41. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rulemaking: A
Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1958) (citations
omitted). And consider the following: "[Tihe legislature, informed . . . of the needs

and problems of the courts, without expert or responsible or disinterested or systematic advice as to the workings of one rule or another, patches the fabric here and

there, and mars often when it would mend." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35
HARV. L. REV. 113, 113-14 (1921). This public policy perspective is not new to
Illinois. See Trumbull, supra note 15, at 452 ("The arguments for primary or exclusive

judicial responsibility for the regulation of practice and procedure in the courts are
in the aggregate more impressive and more persuasive than those for paramount
legislative responsibility").
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reformers consequently often run between the legislature and the
judiciary, in doubt as to who possesses primary authority over an
issue or who has the initial power to act. In Illinois today, the supreme
court possesses primary authority over administrative, supervisory,
professional conduct, and most appellate practice rules, while the
General Assembly exercises (though it may not rightfully possess)
primary authority over most other practice and procedure areas.
Beyond the foregoing reasons, primary judicial authority over all
procedural law would help lessen the growing problems caused by
differences between absolute and less than absolute rulemaking power.
In Illinois, there are increasing pockets of procedural law deemed
within the high court's absolute control. Such areas seemingly include
at least the regulation of those admitted to legal practice and the rules
of appellate procedure. They may also include all guidelines "necessary to the full performance of the judicial function. ' ' 42 The case law
recognizing such absolute high court authority is, of course, tied to
the noted constitutional developments. Unfortunately, absolute power
is often confused with the concept of exclusive power. A brief review
of selected Illinois cases will demonstrate a failure to differentiate the
areas subject to absolute power or to define the varying forms of
exclusive power. Assertions of absolutism and exclusivity in rulemaking then compound the difficulties already inherent in the Illinois
system of shared powers where the primary authority over procedural
law is divided between the legislature and the judiciary.
In the area of admission to legal practice, the Illinois Supreme
Court has long held that the power to regulate and define the practice
of law is a prerogative of the judiciary as an incident to the separation
of powers. 43 This separation creates within the judicial branch the
inherent authority to regulate the study of law and the admission to
the bar."4 As a result, the judiciary possesses the final authority to
define the nature of legal practice by laypersons as well as by lawyers.
People v. Goodman,45 for example, involved legislation granting
the Illinois Industrial Commission the power to make rules dictating
procedure before it. Pursuant to this grant of authority, the Commis42. People v. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d 252, 257, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1977). See

generally Graham, Introduction: The Illinois Supreme Court at the Threshold, 1978

U. ILL. L.F. 104, 106 (1978) (the breadth of the opinion in Jackson suggests that
sections of the Civil Practice Act are unconstitutional even where statutes do not
conflict with judicial rules).
43. People v. Goodman, 366 Il1. 346, 349, 8 N.E.2d 941, 944 (1937).
44. Id. at 349-50, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
45. 366 Ill.
346, 8 N.E.2d 941 (1937).
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sion had promulgated a rule allowing a claimant to be represented by

his attorney or "agent." 46 Under this rule, a non-lawyer had built a
lucrative practice of handling compensation claims. 47
In finding that the non-lawyer had engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and therefore should be fined, the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the unlicensed practice of law, whether in or out of
court, is a contempt in that it usurps the privilege of an attorney to
practice law. 48 The court noted that although the General Assembly
may pass laws forbidding certain legal practice, such laws can only
augment, but cannot "supersede or detract from, the power of the
judicial department to control the practice of law." ' 49
Thus, the Goodman court concluded that the legislature could
not view the practice of law as being confined to courtroom activity,
and that the assembly could not bestow upon an administrative body
the authority to confer upon a layperson the right to practice law.
Rather, the court said the definition of legal practice and the estab-

lishment of standards lie within the "inherent" realm of the judiciary. 50

In Goodman, the Illinois Supreme Court claimed an exclusive
authority to regulate admission to the bar. In that context, the power
was superior but not absolute, because judicial authority was subject
to supplementation and augmentation by statutes which added to, but
did not contradict, existing judicial rules. 1 Like the regulation of
46. Id. at 352, 8 N.E.2d at 945.
47. Id. at 348-49, 8 N.E.2d at 943.
48. Id. at 350, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
49. Id. at 349, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
50. Id. at 349-50, 8 N.E.2d at 944.
51. Language in In re Anastaplo, 3 Ill. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954), further
demonstrates the high court's acknowledgement that its standards of admission to
the bar permit supplementation by statute. There, the petitioner had successfully
passed the Illinois Bar Examination, but the Committee on Character and Fitness
determined that he did not possess the general fitness necessary for admission. This
determination was based upon petitioner's refusal to discuss his possible membership
in the Communist Party. The Committee's opinion was premised on the notion that
a member of the Communist Party "might not be able in good faith to take the oath
of office ... ." Id. at 474, 121 N.E.2d at 828. Holding that the Committee had
properly inquired into petitioner's ability to take the oath in good conscience, the
court stated:
In the exercise of its judicial power over the bar, and in discharge of its
responsibility for the choice of personnel who will compose that bar, this
court has adopted Rule 58 which governs admissions and provides .. . that
applicants shall be admitted to the practice of law by this court after
satisfactory examination by the Board of Examiners and certification of

828
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admission to legal practice, the supreme court has also declared its
exclusive domain over the governance of those admitted to the bar.
But in this latter context, the term may mean an absolute or sole
authority to govern attorneys which does not admit supplementation
or augmentation by any other lawmaker. Thus, in People ex rel.
Brazen v. Finley5 2 the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a circuit
court rule requiring an affidavit of compliance with various ethical
rules adopted by the circuit court. The local rule mandated that an
affidavit accompany initial pleadings in specific types of cases, including personal injury and domestic relations actions." The local
approval by a Committee on Character and Fitness ....

Still another

condition precedent to admission to practice law in this State, imposed by

the legislature, is the taking of an oath .... Such an oath requires loyalty
to our government ... thus inquiry aimed at determining the loyalty of an

applicant, must be deemed to be relevant to a determination of the conditions
for admittance fixed both by the statute and by the rule of this court.
Id. at 475-76, 121 N.E.2d at 829. See also Lozoff v. Shore Heights, Ltd., 66 111. 2d
398, 362 N.E.2d 1047 (1977), where a Wisconsin attorney sought recovery of legal
fees for services he had rendered in Illinois. There the court cited, with approval,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 13, para. 1 (1969), which prohibited the allowance of attorneys
fees for persons other than attorneys licensed in Illinois. Reciting language from
Goodman, the court held: "Such statutes are merely in aid of, and do not supersede
or detract from, the power of the judicial department to control the practice of law."
Id. at 402, 362 N.E.2d at 1048-49.
The legislature's secondary authority over admission to the bar, however, is
limited. Legislation must be both general and reasonable. These requirements were
expressed in In re Day, 181 Il1. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899). There, the General Assembly
had passed legislation that whenever the Illinois Supreme Court changed its rules of
admission to the bar, such new rules could only have prospective force. Thus, anyone
who had begun studying law before the change could obtain a license by complying
with the old rules of admission. As a result of this legislation, it happened that
persons who commenced their study before November 4, 1897 could obtain a license
by completing only two years of study, but those who began study on or after that
date would be required to complete three years of study. The court found the
enactment to be "special legislation" and remarked that if the legislature had any
authority over admission to the practice of law, such authority could only be exercised
through a general law. Id. at 80, 54 N.E. at 647. The court further stated that
legislation regarding admission to the bar must be reasonable. The court said:
The legislature may enact police legislation for the protection of the public
against things hurtful or threatening to their safety and welfare. So long as
they do not infringe upon the powers properly belonging to the courts they
may prescribe reasonable conditions which will exclude from the practice
those persons through whom injurious consequences are likely to result to
the inhabitants of the State ....

Id. at 95, 54 N.E. at 652 (emphasis added).
52. 119 Ill. 2d 485, 519 N.E.2d 898 (1988).
53. COOK COUNTY CIR. C.R. 0.7, quoted in Finley, 119 Il. 2d at 488-89, 519
N.E.2d at 899-900.
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rules of ethics to be enforced through the affidavit requirement were,
in substance, covered by two Supreme Court Rules found in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.14
In Brazen, a licensed attorney challenged the authority of the
circuit court to promulgate this affidavit requirement. Proponents of
the local rule contended that Supreme Court Rule 21(a) granted to
the circuit court the rulemaking authority to impose the affidavit
requirement." Rule 21(a) provides that
a majority of the circuit court judges in eaCh circuit may adopt
rules governing civil and criminal cases which are consistent
with these rules and the statutes of the State, and which, so
far as practicable, shall be uniform throughout the State. 6
Proponents urged that the affidavit requirement was consistent with
Supreme Court Rules because it sought, in effect, to assure compliance
with certain provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, they argued, the affidavit requirement aided, but did not
7
supplant, the statewide rules.1

The supreme court rejected the position that circuit courts share
the power to regulate and discipline attorney conduct. 8 Citing earlier
cases recognizing that certain high court power is exclusive, 9 the court
stated: "This court's sole authority to regulate and discipline attorney
conduct arises from our inherent power to govern admission to the
54. Rules 2-103 and 5-103 of the ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
discussed in Brazen, 119 I11.
2d at 490, 519 N.E.2d at 900.
55. Brazen, 119 Il. 2d at 490-91, 519 N.E.2d at 900-01.
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 21(a) (1985), quoted in part in Brazen,
119 11. 2d at 490, 519 N.E.2d at 900.
57. Brazen, 119 11. 2d at 490-91, 519.N.E.2d at 900-01.
58. Id. at 492, 519 N.E.2d at 901. Proponents of the Cook County rule asserted
that the Supreme Court had recognized concurrent authority by the high court and
the circuit courts to govern attorney conduct in Arnold v. Northern Trust Co., 116
Ill. 2d 157, 506 N.E.2d 1279 (1987). There, attorneys challenged a circuit court rule
requiring attorneys for minors and incompetents in personal injury actions to submit
sworn petitions supporting contingent fee requests in excess of 25% of the settlement.
The validity of this local rule was upheld. The court in Brazen distinguished Arnold,
stating that it was based upon the circuit court's duty to protect the interests of
minors and not upon a finding of concurrent power to regulate attorney behavior.
Brazen, 119 I11.
2d at 492, 519 N.E.2d at 901 citing Arnold, 116 Ill.
2d at 169, 506
N.E.2d at 1279.
59. In re Harris, 93 I11.
2d 285, 443 N.E.2d 557 (1982); In re Mitan, 75 I11.
2d
118, 387 N.E.2d 278 (1979); In re Teitelbaum, 13 I11.
2d 586, 150 N.E.2d 873 (1958);
People ex rel. 111.State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 I11.
462,
176 N.E. 901 (1931); In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
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practice of law in Illinois." 6 Pursuant to this exclusive authority, the
Illinois Supreme Court said that it had established a comprehensive
scheme for regulating and punishing attorney misconduct. 6 The court
concluded that the local rule was an improper transgression upon
"the exclusive rulemaking and disciplinary authority invested in the
Supreme Court," in that it "impose[d] a greater burden on attorneys
than this court now required," since the Supreme Court Rules require
62
no affidavit of compliance.
Brazen involved a local court rule rather than a statute. The
court's rationale, however, clearly suggests that the source of the
offending law was irrelevant to the decision. Rather, where the
supreme court enjoys absolute or sole rulemaking authority, there is
no room for other laws, regardless of their nature or source.
A third area in which the judiciary has claimed exclusive rulemaking responsibilities involves appellate procedure. As noted earlier,
the constitution confers upon the Illinois Supreme Court the power
to provide by rule for appeals in certain cases from the circuit courts
directly to the supreme court and for appeals to the appellate court
from other than final judgments of the circuit court.
Pursuant to this latter power, the court promulgated a rule which
allowed appeals by the state of certain orders in criminal cases,
including orders suppressing evidence.6 3 The General Assembly later
enacted contradictory legislation by amending the Code of Criminal
Procedure to provide that orders suppressing evidence in a preliminary
hearing are non-final and unappealable by the state, thus having no
effect in subsequent proceedings. 64 The validity of the legislation was
65
challenged in People v. Taylor.
In Taylor, the defendant was charged with unlawful possession
of narcotics. At the preliminary hearing the judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his
residence. Later, a grand jury indicted the defendant for the same
offense. At trial the defendant again moved to suppress the evidence,
60. Brazen, 119 Il1. 2d at 492, 519 N.E.2d at 901 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 494, 519 N.E.2d at 902 (referring to the ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY; the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission; the
creation of a procedure for the investigation, hearing, and review of charges of
attorney misconduct; and, the rules on the types of discipline available for Code
infractions).
62. Id. at 494, 519 N.E.2d at 902.
63. The former rule is found in People v. Taylor, 50 Il1. 2d 136, 139, 277
N.E.2d 878, 880 (1971).
64. Taylor, 50 IIl. 2d at 138-39, 277 N.E.2d at 880.
65. 50 Il1. 2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1971).
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arguing that because the state had failed to appeal the previous
suppression order, that order was binding. The trial court agreed, but
was reversed. 66 The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. 67
The state contended on appeal that as a result of the statute, the
order entered in the preliminary hearing was not appealable and was
therefore not binding at the subsequent trial. The defendant argued
that the section violated the constitutional provision which vests rulemaking authority in the Illinois Supreme Court and which provides
for no General Assembly participation. Because the court had provided by rule for appeals from orders suppressing evidence, the
defendant argued the General Assembly lacked authority to declare
such orders non-appealable.6 8 In holding the section of the Code void,
the court held that the constitution vested "sole authority" in the
supreme court to promulgate rules regarding appeals to the appellate
court from non-final judgments. 69 Because the order suppressing
evidence entered in the preliminary hearing was an appealable order
pursuant to the rule and the state did not appeal, the order was found
binding on the trial court.70
The Taylor decision leaves little doubt that the court will jealously
guard its rulemaking powers respecting certain appeals, and will strike
down legislation contradicting its rules. The validity of a statute which
purports to regulate such appeals in areas not covered by Supreme
Court Rules is unclear, although language in Taylor suggests even
7
such legislation would be void. '
One of the most dramatic acknowledgments of exclusive judicial
rulemaking authority occurred in the 1977 Illinois Supreme Court
66. People v. Taylor, 124 I11.App. 2d 268 (1970).
67. Taylor, 50 I11.2d at 137, 277 N.E.2d at 879.
68. Id. at 139, 277 N.E.2d at 880.
69. Id. at 140, 277 N.E.2d at 881. The court noted the constitutional rulemaking authority relevant to the appellate rule at issue contained no reference to
General Assembly participation, though other court rules on appeal could only be
promulgated constitutionally if they were subject to law. Id. at 139-40, 277 N.E.2d
at 880-81. See supra notes 34 & 35 and accompanying text discussing ILL. CONST. of
1870, art. VI, § 5 and its subsequent "repeal" in the 1970 Constitution. On this
latter point, consider the current constitutional provision on rules involving direct
appellate review of administrative agency decisions. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Benton Police Dept. v. Human Rights Comm'n, 147 Ill. App. 3d 7, 497
N.E.2d 876 (5th Dist. 1986).
70. Taylor, 50 Ill. 2d at 140, 277 N.E.2d at 880.
71. Id. The Court in Taylor declared that because the constitutional delegation
of rulemaking authority employed by the court makes no reference to General
Assembly participation, the court was vested with "sole authority." Id. at 139-40,
277 N.E.2d at 880-81.
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decision of People v. Jackson.72 The case involved the high court's
"general administrative and supervisory authority." Under this authority,7 3 the Illinois Supreme Court had promulgated a rule which
directed trial courts to examine prospective jurors, but which author-74
ized them to allow the parties to question potential jurors directly.
This rule conflicted with an amendment to the Code of Criminal
Procedure which granted attorneys the right to examine jurors personally. 75 In Jackson, the circuit court held this amendment unconstitutional, and apparently refused to allow the defendant's attorney the
opportunity to conduct voir dire examination.
On appeal, the supreme court framed the issue as "whether76
control of voir dire examination is a judicial or legislative function."
The court began its analysis by reciting the constitutional provision
on separation of powers, wherein one branch is forbidden from
exercising powers properly belonging to another. 77 The court also
noted the provision on the "judicial power", finding it to be an
"exclusive grant" of power, as well as the provision on "general
administrative and supervisory authority." 7 Finally, the court turned
to the constitution's provision regarding an annual judicial conference,
at which proposals to improve the administration of justice would be
developed. 79 Since the foundation for the rule governing voir dire was
laid by the judicial conference, the court reasoned that it must be "a
product of this court's supervisory and administrative responsibility." ' Hence, the General Assembly lacked authority to regulate voir
dire examinations, and the statutory amendment constituted an infringement by the legislature upon the judicial branch.8

72. 69 Ill. 2d 252, 371 N.E.2d 602 (1977).
73. Id. at 259, 371 N.E.2d at 605.

74. Id. at 255, 371 N.E.2d at 603.

75. Id. But see Whitlock v. Salmon, 56 U.S.L.W. 2575 (Mar. 30, 1988) (No.
18043) (finding a similar statute to be "an acceptable solidification" of a comparable
rule).
76. Jackson, 69 Ill. 2d at 255, 371 N.E.2d at 603.
77. Id. at 255-56, 371 N.E.2d at 604 citing ILL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
78. Id. at 256-57, 371 N.E.2d at 604-05 citing ILL. CONST. art. V1, §§ 1, 16.
79. Id. at 259, 371 N.E.2d at 605 citing ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 17.

80. Id.
81. Id. at 260, 371 N.E.2d at 605-06. Jackson may soon be expanded to
invalidate statutes interfering with the exercise of judicial power even where there is
no judicial rule directly in conflict. See, e.g., David Ware v. Central DuPage Hosp.,
No. 66197 (appeal filed) (1988) (involving statutory right of voluntary dismissal). But

see Kahle v. John Deere Co., 104 Ill. 2d 302, 308, 472 N.E.2d 787, 789-90 (1984)
(difficulties with statutory right of dismissal should be addressed by legislature).
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As the foregoing cases demonstrate, exclusive judicial authority
means that court rules will override conflicting statutes. Occasionally,
it also means that statutes are forbidden entirely in areas governed by
rules, even if the statutes would not conflict with any existing rules.
However, by shifting the primary authority over all procedural law
completely to the judiciary, concerns about differences between areas
of exclusive and non-exclusive power, as well as between areas of
primary judicial and legislative authority, will be reduced, if not
eliminated. Thus, unfortunate clashes over legislative intrusions into
areas of exclusive judicial prerogative will disappear and the efficiency
and expertise noted by Levin and Amsterdam will be promoted. In
all matters of procedure, the judiciary will assume the bulk of
responsibility.
C.

OPEN AND ACCESSIBLE DEBATE

In promulgating a comprehensive set of rules, the judiciary must
abide by democratic principles mandating that majority sentiment
usually prevail and that such sentiment be determined after an open
debate accessible to all who wish to participate. In so doing, the
judiciary can accommodate the legislature's concerns about particular
rules-whether or not in the area of absolute judicial power-by
implementing a deliberative process which necessitates input from
General Assembly members. Disputes over the boundaries of legislative and judicial power will inevitably continue to arise; yet, with
open and accessible judicial rulemaking for all areas of procedural
law, conflicts should become less frequent.
With primary, if not absolute, judicial authority over all procedural law, disputes about the boundaries of governmental power will
most likely arise when the legislature passes a law significantly affecting procedure but designed to foster a substantive law policy. One
such law in Illinois deals with the certification of claims by attorneys
in medical malpractice actions.12 Though arguably within the sphere
82. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-622 (1985). But see Parness, Frivolous
Pleadings in Illinois: Observations on the 1985 Medical MalpracticeReforms, 74 ILL.

B.J. 238 (1986) (suggesting the Illinois Supreme Court was "better suited" to alter

medical malpractice pleading law); Montford & Barber, 1987 Texas Tort Reform:

The Quest for a Fairer and More Predictable Texas Civil Justice System, 25 Hous.
L. REV. 245, 354-55 (1988) (noting Texas Supreme Court's repeal of a comparable

Texas statute on actions in tort). See also Struckoff v. Struckoff, 76 Ill. 2d 53, 389
N.E.2d 1170 (1979) (statute requiring bifurcated trial in marriage dissolution action
is not unconstitutional as a legislative encroachment upon judicial rulemaking, at
least where there exists no conflicting rule, sineFe legislature controls conditions of
dissolution and since it is reasonable to protect all whose lives are impacted by an

end to a marriage).
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of legislative power because of its goal to reduce the litigation burdens
of the medical profession and its insurers, in enacting this law the
General Assembly failed to engage in an adequate deliberative process.
The procedural dimensions of the law went largely unconsidered by
legislators chiefly responsible for court and legal profession guidelines,
as well as by Illinois judges and lawyers. 83 Perhaps the inattention to
procedural law policy occurred because the law was subsumed in a
package of proposals largely focused on substantive tort reform. More
alarming still is a second recent statute dealing generally with claim
certification by attorneys, thus covering claims and defenses in all
civil actions regardless of their nature.8 4 That act seemingly intrudes
upon an area within, at least, primary judicial authority as it involves
attorney conduct. The act's relationship to any particular substantive
law policy remains unclear.85 Again, adequate deliberations on procedural law concerns seemed absent in the legislature.8 6 This is particularly troubling as the certification law is quite controversial, having
been rejected by some jurisdictions and undergoing reconsideration in
others where it has already been adopted.
Increased judicial rulemaking, undertaken in an open and accessible way, would help diminish disputes over proposed substantive
law statutes having significant procedural law implications. Mechanisms to assure dialogue on such statutory proposals between legislators
and judicial rulemakers would exist in an open and accessible judicial
rulemaking mechanism. With advance warning, constitutional questions regarding separation of powers could even be avoided if the
rulemakers adopted the procedural law components of any such
statute as part of a new rule.87
83. See letter from Senator Roger Keats to Jeffrey A. Parness (Sept. 4, 1985)
(copy permanently on file with the N. ILL. U.L. REV.).
84. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-611 (Supp. 1986).
85. See Parness, supra note 82, at 240 ("It may well be that the Illinois General

Assembly has some authority to attempt to alter attorney conduct. Nevertheless, the
Illinois Supreme Court is usually better suited to such a task, particularly when the

conduct has no substantive law implications."). But see, e.g., Patterson v. Northern
Trust Co., 286 111.564, 122 N.E. 55 (1919) (checking "pestiferous litigants" is the
responsibility of the General Assembly).
86. Solovy, Wedoff & Bart-Howe, Attorney Sanctions Under Section 2-611 of
Code, 133 Chi. Daily L. Bull., Jan. 13, 1987, at 2, col. 1 ("Due to the speed with

which the law was enacted, there is a dearth of legislative history ....

").

87. See, e.g., In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369 (Fla. 1979),

modified on other grounds, 404 So. 2d 443 (1981) ("To avoid multiple appeals and
confusion ... caused by assertions that portions of the evidence code are procedural
and, therefore, unconstitutional ... the Court ... adopts . . . the provisions of the
evidence code . . . to the extent that they are procedural . . ."). Id.
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Boundary disputes between the legislature and judiciary are also
likely to arise when the judiciary, as primary lawmaker, promulgates
a rule having a significant impact on the enforcement of a substantive
right within the legislature's domain or on a right guaranteed constitutionally. Consider judicially-promulgated rules on derivative or class
89
actions,88 as well as rules governing the conduct of a jury trial.
Again, open and accessible judicial rulemaking will satisfy democratic
principles, and will assure the dialogue between legislators and judicial
rulemakers which is necessary to minimize infringements of substantive rights by procedural rules.
Beyond reducing problems caused by differences between areas
of absolute and shared responsibilities, and between procedural guidelines subject to one primary lawmaker or another, increased judicial
rulemaking, undertaken in conformity with democratic principles, will
result in almost all procedural law reforms being initiated by the
judiciary. Thus, most procedural law should be found in judicial
rules, and the difficulties created by the need to integrate procedural
law statutes and rules would be substantially eliminated. Accountability for procedural law reform would also be clearly placed. The
prospect of procedural law reformers running back and forth between
9
the legislature and the courts would be significantly reduced. 0

II.

REMEDIAL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

Primary judicial authority for all procedural law is supported by
both constitutional history and strong public policy rationales. Such
authority can be exercised without forsaking cherished democratic
principles. Yet, without express constitutional mandate, such authority
seemingly will not be exercised. While the legislature long ago expressly delegated procedural law-making powers to the judiciary at a
time when Illinois constitutional law on judicial power recognized
88. See, e.g., Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 337 (1971).

89. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973) (local rule
providing for six person juries does not violate seventh amendment jury trial right,
with no view expressed "as to whether any number less than six would suffice").
90. Consider recent efforts at altering the law regarding grand jury power to
subpoena attorneys; a petition for a rule change was filed with the Illinois Supreme

Court only after a bill (requiring that subpoenas receive prior judicial approval) was
passed by the General Assembly but vetoed by the Governor. Golden, ISBA Gets
Support From ABA on Attorney Subpoena Issue, 134 Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar. 8,
1988, at 1, col. 2; Schweit, Daley Opposes ISBA Plan to Limit Lawyer Subpoenas,
134 Chi. Daily L. Bull., Mar. 24, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
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very significant General Assembly duties regarding court structure, 9'

it has not stopped exercising those powers itself in significant ways.
As well, while the 1977 Illinois Supreme Court decision in People v.
Jackson may have signaled "a new era of Illinois Supreme Court

involvement in the process of developing rules of procedure and [for]

the conduct of trials,"92 the court has yet to move in fact toward
establishing "a comprehensive and unified system of regulation of

procedure and the trial of cases in Illinois." 91 Illinois is thus left with

"an unnecessarily complex, disorganized, and frequently
unclear, if
not inconsistent, morass of statutes, rules and judicial decisions" on
procedural law. 94 The General Assembly's recent passage of a general
statute on attorney certification of claims and defenses, modeled on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,91 illustrates well the legislature's

unfortunate continuing involvement in procedural law, as well as the
continuing inertia of the high court. 96
Constitutional change is the best way, and perhaps the only way,
to remedy existing problems in the distribution and exercise of pro.91. A part of the Code of Civil Procedure states:
(a) The Supreme Court of this State has power to make rules of pleading,
practice and procedure for the circuit, Appellate and Supreme Courts
supplementary to, but not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and
to amend the same, for the purpose of making this Act effective for the
convenient administration of justice, and otherwise simplifying judicial
procedure, and power to make rules governing pleading, practice and
procedure in small claims actions, including service of process in connection
therewith....
(b) Subject to the rules of the Supreme Court, the circuit and Appellate
Courts may make rules regulating their dockets, calendars, and business.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 1-104 (1985). This delegation was added to the Civil
Practice Act of 1933, a time when the General Assembly had greater constitutionallydefined responsibilities for organizing the Illinois judicial system. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-30.
92. Graham, supra note 42, at 107.
93. Id. at 109. In the absence of constitutional amendments expressly recognizing primary judicial authority over all procedural law, this lack of movement may
be wise-though such a movement may be supported by case law and by statute. See

supra note 91. See also, e.g., Comment, The Revision of American State Constitutions: Legislative Power, PopularSovereignty, and ConstitutionalChange, 75 CALIF.

L. REV. 1473, 1475 (1987) (urging that in the area of individual rights, the procedurally
arduous means of constitutional change rather than extratextual procedures (case
development) are preferable because they represent an accepted norm, foster societal

consensus on basic values, promote constitutional stability and limit majoritarianism).

94. Graham, supra note 42, at 108.
95. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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cedural law-making powers. Needed are constitutional amendments
which more clearly define the primary and secondary authority over
Illinois procedural law and which delegate all primary authority to
the judiciary. As well, amendments are needed which better assure
open and accessible judicial rulemaking.
A. ABSOLUTE, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY AUTHORITY OVER
PROCEDURAL LAW

In addressing the problems in the distribution of authority over
procedural law, constitutional drafters should maintain, where feasible, well-developed and well-understood precedents. A continuing
ability of the courts to recognize pockets of absolute judicial authority
seems warranted; thus, certain areas of procedural law should be free
of any legislative oversight. Yet, such areas should be small. Some
absolute authority seems necessary for certain "general administrative
and supervisory" guidelines, as well as for certain guidelines covering
the regulation of the legal profession (including rules for attorney
admission and discipline). Generally, pockets of absolute judicial
authority should include matters "so fundamental and so necessary
absence would render the phrase "judicial
to a court" that their
97
meaningless.
power"
Most procedural law guidelines would be subject only to a
primary, non-absolute judicial authority. The exercise of such authority should vary, however, depending upon the guidelines under
consideration. Judicial rules concerning the establishment of administrative, supervisory or professional conduct guidelines should always
prevail over inconsistent statutes and should not otherwise be subject
to override by the legislature. All statutes establishing administrative,
supervisory or professional conduct guidelines need not be precluded.
Rather, judicial rulemakers should defer to the General Assembly in
these areas when judicial rules are lacking but are needed, or when
augmentation of existing judicial rules seems necessary. This legislative
power to fill gaps and to augment should be rarely exercised, and it

97. Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 30. See also U.S. v. Brainer, 691
F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 348 N.W.2d 559 (1984);
In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complaints, 96 N.J. 669, 477 A.2d 339 (1984);
Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 562 n.7 (3d Cir. 1985). Distinctions
involving the pockets of absolute judicial authority seemingly necessitate "nice
distinctions that may be troublesome," but which are "nonetheless necessary."
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986).
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should require a supermajority vote in each house. 98 Such a legislative
power should usually only be employed when the General Assembly
pursues a substantive law goal in ways which significantly touch upon
the implementation of judicial rules. The aforedescribed statute on
the certification of medical malpractice claims may exemplify such
legislative power, as the legislature sought to reduce the numbers of
certain substantive law claims and yet acted in an area, the regulation
of attorney conduct during litigation, which the judiciary has placed
within its exclusive domain. As will soon be demonstrated, the creation
of open and accessible judicial rulemaking mechanisms should provide
General Assembly members with ample opportunity for input during
most judicial deliberations on administrative, supervisory, or professional conduct rules. It also should provide judicial rulemakers with
a channel by which to communicate with the legislature about pending
bills having procedural law ramifications.
Judicial authority over other areas of procedure (including matters often characterized as rules of practice and procedure) should be
subject to a differing form of primary judicial authority. In these
areas, the judiciary would initiate discussion of, and promulgate,
almost all procedural law guidelines. However, this authority would
be subject to greater legislative review. The judiciary would not possess
the "final say." Rather, prior to their effectiveness, judicial rules in
these areas would have to be submitted to the General Assembly,
which could block implementation by a supermajority vote in each
house. 99 Subsequent to implementation, the General Assembly could
repeal, supplement or augment such judicial rules by a similar vote. 00
Of course, such secondary authority over procedural law is in addition
to the participatory rights afforded legislators during open judicial
rulemaking deliberations.
98. Compare Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 39-40 (suggesting a two-

thirds vote of the legislators in each house) and FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2 (two-thirds
vote of each house can repeal a rule) with Gallant, Judicial Rule-Making
Absent
Legislative Review: The Limits of Separation of Powers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 447 (1985)

(inadvisable to limit legislative review of judicial rules).
99. The requirement of presentment to the governor seemingly holds even where
the legislature is only blocking implementation of a judicial rule. INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) (unconstitutionality of a one-house legislative veto); see also
General Assembly of New Jersey v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982). Though
a two-thirds or three-fifths vote by each house is sufficient to overcome gubernatorial
veto, ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 9, arguably presentment of such a supermajority vote to
the governor would still be necessary in order to assure executive branch participation
in lawmaking.
100. See Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 40 n.185.
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The legislature's authority over procedural law guidelines under

011 Such secondary
such a scheme would thus always be secondary.
authority would be somewhat stronger in the areas outside of administration, supervision and professional conduct regulation. Yet, in all
settings, most procedural law guidelines would not require affirmative

General Assembly action.

Prior to any consideration of how such primary judicial authority
ought to be exercised, and thus of the merits of public process judicial
rulemaking, a final question lingers: should the judiciary's primary
authority over procedural law always be assumed by courts? While
formal judicial rulemaking by groups of judges who do not form a
single court has been relatively unknown in Illinois, there are prece-

dents elsewhere. In California, for example, a council of judges (who
serve on a variety of appellate and trial courts) is constitutionally

responsible for adopting "rules for court administration, practice and
procedure, not inconsistent with statute."'0 2 Comparably, some are

now urging'0 3 that the rulemaking powers of the United States Supreme Court be transferred to the Judicial Conference of the United
States 04 (where many feel they already lie de facto). Such non-court

judicial rulemaking has much to commend it. For example, groups
of judges from various courts will likely reflect diverse backgrounds
and significant expertise in all levels of procedural law. As well, unlike

the United States Supreme Court as rulemaker, a non-court judicial
rulemaker would never later sit in a case challenging one of its own

rules.10o This is not to suggest that the absence of the high court as
101. Secondary authority is justifiable as procedural laws both "may have radical
impact on the community" and possess "the potential of frustrating substantive
policies." Levin & Amsterdam, supra note 41, at 18. See also Kaplan & Greene, The
Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule - Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v.
Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 235, 254 (1951) ("it seems doubtful wisdom for a court

to place itself beyond legislative control when it pronounces general rules"). But see
Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REV. 28, 43-

46 (1952) (urging there be no legislative authority).
102. CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 6. For a description of the California Judicial
Council, see Kuzins, Ordering the Courts, 6 CAL. LAW 43 (1986). See also N.J. JUD.
LAW § 214 (1937) (judicial conference); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.730 (1985) (Council on
Court Procedures).

103. See Lewis, The Excessive History of FederalRule 15(c) and Its Lessons for
Civil Rules Revision, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1507, 1568 n.295 (1987).

104. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1987) (currently, the Judicial Conference recommends to
the U.S. Supreme Court changes to Supreme Court Rules governing lower federal
courts).
105. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM.
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final rulemaker is without cost. For example, its absence might
undermine the efforts at achieving a unified court system-a goal of

Illinois constitutional reforms in the past decades.

°6

Perhaps, while

not acting as final rulemaker, the supreme court might maintain a

power to review and reject judicially-promulgated rules of others
before they take effect.10 7 While further investigation and debate seems

warranted, delegation of primary authority to non-court judicial rulemakers may be preferable.
Regardless of which judicial rulemaker must give the final stamp
of approval, groups of judges from different Illinois courts should be
chiefly responsible for drafting, debating, and proposing most judicial
rules. In this state and elsewhere, a high court with final rulemaking
authority inevitably delegates most of its power to advisory committees
consisting of lower court judges (as well as lawyers and others).
Though such delegation is common, the processes utilized by these

judicial rulemakers are subject to much variation. The history in
Illinois reveals processes which are too often closed and secretive.' 08
Constitutional amendments regarding primary judicial authority for

procedural law must be accompanied by amendments more descriptive
of the judicial rulemaking processes so that open and accessible
judicial rulemaking is better assured.
B. PUBLIC PROCESS JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

Because the processes for judicial rulemaking in Illinois are
frequently closed and secretive, often little is known of the participants
L. REv. 905, 935 (1976) ("The argument that the Court remains completely free in
fact to reconsider judicially the rules it has adopted legislatively is not supported by
the history of judicial review of rules."). For additional references, see Lewis, supra
note 103, at 1565 n.274.
106. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 69 I11.2d 252, 256, 371 N.E.2d 602, 604
(1977) (constitutional recognition of the supreme court's supervisory authority over
all courts "was employed to fortify the concept of a centrally supervised court
system").
107. See, e.g., CoL. REV. STAT. § 7, Rule 121(a) (1987) (local court rules
submitted to Supreme Court take effect 45 days later unless rejected in writing). This
rule has recently been changed. See 16 Colo. Law. 2209-10 (1987) (amendment to
Rule 121(a) requiring written approval by high court of any new local rule). See also
Frazier v. Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607, 2612 n.7 (1987) (supervisory power of high court
to intervene and void local court rules) and FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (circuit judicial
council may abrogate local rule).
108. See Burleigh, Court Rules Made to be Amended, Deleted, Chi. Daily L.
Bull., Jan. 9, 1985, at 2, col. 2, where it is said: "Supreme Court rules govern
everything .

.

. Yet the method by which these rules are amended, addended to or

deleted does not satisfy many attorneys, who say they are often surprised by rule
changes made without their input, through channels unknown."

1988:817]

PARNESS AND KELLER: JUDICIAL RULEMAKING

(especially those who advise the final judicial rulemaker, as well as
those who advise those advisors). Little is also usually known of
judicial rulemaking deliberations. This is particularly troublesome
when judicial rules affect sensitive issues of social policy rather than
addressing merely technical issues. 1' 9 A more open and accessible
system may even be mandated under the emerging first amendment
right of access."10 It surely is compelled by democratic principles; such
principles require that widespread and informed debate usually precede legislative or quasi-legislative action. As well, an open system
serves such pragmatic goals as enhancing the quality of the final
product and promoting the acceptance of rules by those subject to
their dictates."'
Several general characteristics of open and accessible, and thus
public process, judicial rulemaking can be identified. They include a
relatively permanent and known rulemaking process: the assurance of
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to rule promulgation; a requirement that a reasoned basis for decision accompany new
rules; and the opportunity for public initiative." 2 These attributes will
vary somewhat in implementation, depending upon such factors as
the judicial rulemaker (a court, or a group of judges, lawyers and
others); the judicial rule under consideration (a narrow, technical rule,
or a rule affecting sensitive policy issues); and the degree of autonomy
possessed by the judicial rulemaker (absolute authority or one of two
forms of primary authority)." 3
It seems unnecessary, and unwise, for the judicial rulemaking
processes to be described in great detail within the constitution. Clear
constitutional recognition of primary judicial authority over all procedural rules should prompt judicial rulemakers to adopt public
process attributes, because the legislative character of their work and
the later minimal involvement of the General Assembly would be
109. Parness, Public Process and State-Court Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 1319,
1322 (1979).

110. See WJW-TV Inc. v. Cleveland, Civil Action No. C87-1524 (N.D. Ohio

March 30, 1988) described in Public Access to Meetings Ruled a Right, Nat'l L.J.,

April 18, 1988 at 20, col. 1 (recognizing first amendment access right to meetings of
legislative bodies, including a city council). See also Parness & Copeland, Access to
Judicial Rulemaking Procedures, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 641 (1982) (urging first amendment access right covers judicial rulemaking proceedings).
111. Parness & Manthey, Public Process and State Judicial Rulemaking, 1 PACE
L. REV. 121, 130-32 (1980) (reviewing rationales for increased public process).

112. Id. at 132-44 (reviewing in detail techniques for implementing these characteristics into judicial rulemaking mechanisms).
113. Parness, supra note 109, at 1322-24.
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clear. Implementation of public process judicial rulemaking in Illinois
will be facilitated by the recent reforms in other states.11 4 One practice
which must soon be terminated involves the use of ad hoc committees
1
to advise judicial rulemakers."1
The structure and duties of these
advisory bodies is unclear. Preferable are permanent advisory bodies,
whose roles are defined within court rule or elsewhere and whose
membership assures expertise, as well as representation of diverse
elements within and outside the legal profession.
Whether judicial rulemaking is undertaken by a court or others,
and whether absolute or non-absolute primary authority is involved,
public process judicial rulemaking should provide significant opportunity for dialogue between judges and legislators prior to any rule
promulgation. Judicial rules inevitably have some impact on the laws
within the legislature's domain. Thus, where relevant, the substance/
procedure dichotomy, as well as the division between absolute and
non-absolute judicial authority, could be discussed before clashes
develop. Such dialogue should not conflict with principles of separation of powers. Input by legislators during the consideration of
judicially-promulgated rules, in fact, promotes democratic values; it
is easily distinguished from instances of interference by legislators
with judicial consideration of cases, or of interference by judges with
legislative consideration of a bill.
Finally, whether the Illinois Judicial Conference or (preferably)
a smaller and more representative body1 6 continues to serve as advisor
to the high court as rulemaker or is itself delegated some final rulemaking authority, the structure and functions of major judicial rulemaking bodies should be addressed constitutionally. One important
function involves insuring the necessary dialogue between the legisla114. A compilation of recent reforms appears in Parness & Freeman, The Process

of Factfinding in Judicial Rulemaking: "Some Kind of Hearing" on the Factual
Premises Underlying Judicial Rules, 5 PACE L. REV. 1, 3-4 n.3 (1984).

115. Unlike the Federal Judicial Conference which has established, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1987), several permanent and widely-known standing committees to
advise it on rule changes (where those committees, in fact, undertake most of the
rule-making initiative, Weinstein, supra note 99, at 908-09), the Illinois Judicial
Conference apparently has no comparable committees, though its Executive Committee at least has the power to recommend their appointment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
ll0A, § 41(c)(4) (1985).
116. As contrasted with the Federal Judicial Conference or state judicial conferences or councils having rulemaking responsibilities (if only advisory), see supra notes
102 & 104 and accompanying text, the Illinois Judicial Conference is quite large. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 41 (1985). In addition, the Illinois Judicial Conference
is composed only of judges. Id.
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ture and any judicial rulemaker. 1 7 Another is the undertaking of

research (typically through a contractor) on the Illinois judicial system
where such research is outside the province (though with the aid) of
the Administrative Office of the Illinois courts. Federal Judicial
Center 1' 8 activities provide a useful model, as does the work of the
Administrative Conference of the United States.11 9
III.

CONCLUSION

The present distribution and exercise of responsibility for Illinois
procedural law governing courts and the legal profession are troublesome. The division of responsibility between the legislature and the
judiciary too often is unclear and overly deferential to the legislature.
Because primary authority for procedural law is shared by the legislature and the judiciary, unfortunate clashes often develop between
statutes and rules. As well, when debating and establishing procedural
law, the General Assembly often fails to include judges and lawyers
in the dialogue in any significant way.
Primary judicial authority over all procedural law must now be
recognized. Such recognition is supported by both constitutional
history and strong public policy rationales. In exercising responsibility
for procedural law, however, the judiciary must not employ a closed
and secretive process. Public process judicial rulemaking should be
required.
Remedies should come via constitutional amendment. The current
hodgepodge of constitutional provisions on procedural lawmaking
should be replaced by a small set of directives which more clearly
delegate and define primary and secondary authority. These directives
should permit (though not address) some absolute judicial authority,
and should expressly delegate all primary authority to the judiciary.
Only secondary authority should be vested in the legislature. Differences in the forms of primary and secondary authority should be
made clear. Non-court judicial rulemakers should be expressly rec117. Rehnquist, Chief Justice Outlines Court's Changes, Needs," 134 Chi. Daily
L. Bull., Jan. 4, 1988, at 2, col. 1 (reporting on the Federal Judicial Conference's
establishment of a legislative liaison group to assist in monitoring legislation and to
seek to insure Conference views are made known to Congress in a timely and effective
manner).
118. 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1) (1985) (the Center is responsible for conducting
research as well as for stimulating and coordinating the research of others).
119. 5 U.S.C. §§ 571, 574 (1985) (the Conference, assisted by outside experts,
is responsible for research and proposals regarding federal administrative agency
reform).
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ognized, even if their role is only advisory. Finally, constitutional
provisions should promote the use of open and accessible decisionmaking processes during judicial rulemaking.

